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Abstract 
The integration of unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) 
will play a key-role in the world-wide aviation for the 
next years. In order to safely integrate UAS in the 
existing manned aviation, they have to follow the 
same rules and commands as manned aviation 
currently does. One of the major challenges is to 
carry out proper detect and avoid (DAA) with such 
vehicles. A proper working DAA is essential in 
certain airspaces where separation from other 
airspace users is not provided by ATC. To ensure a 
safe detection one possibility is to equip the vehicle 
with active sensors that can sense surrounding traffic. 
To evaluate the level of safety, an understanding for 
minimal detection ranges of such systems has to be 
established. 
Where ATC is not responsible for separation, 
pilots are responsible to stay “well-clear” from each 
other. Manned aviation works with such an imprecise 
rule, but a DAA system needs exact numbers for 
minimum separation distances in order to “remain-
well-clear”. The numerical approach in this paper 
shows one possibility to calculate the offset of 
trajectories in different representative traffic 
scenarios. The offset shall be of a size to just not 
trigger TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) 
RA (Resolution Advisory) alerts, but can be used to 
evaluate DAA algorithms. 
The number of traffic scenarios defined for this 
paper aim at covering most cases encountered in 
practice. Thus, the simulation scenarios constructed 
from these principles can be used to determine 
minimal sensor detection ranges that a real-world 
system has to adhere to in order to be considered safe 
in mixed-traffic operations. 
Introduction 
With more and more parties taking an interest in 
commercial use of unmanned and remotely piloted 
aircraft systems (RPAS) it becomes necessary to 
integrate these vehicles into the traditional airspace. 
Current airspace classification by its primary use 
reflects the main focus of traditional air traffic 
management (ATM) on the upper airspace. For 
example, the German airspace comprises of classes 
C, D, E and G, with almost the entire airspace below 
2500 ft above ground level (AGL) belonging to class 
G. Unmanned aerial vehicles are not directly covered 
by the regulations that apply to airspace G. 
Consequently, stakeholders have stated an 
interest to regulate and possibly restructure parts of 
the airspace to meet the requirements of unmanned 
aerial systems (UAS). In the US the concept of an 
UAS air traffic management (UTM) has been 
devised, and is currently discussed and developed 
further [1]. In Europe a similar concept named U-
Space has been evolved. The concept itself is targeted 
but not limited to urban airspace: The Warsaw 
Declaration [2] states that there is a need for “the 
development of the concept of the U-Space on access 
to low level airspace, especially in urban areas.” This 
makes it clear that currently a demand is seen to 
solve the problem of integrating UAS into airspace. 
SESAR’s recent study “European Drones 
Outlook Study – Unlocking the value of Europe” 
predicts a European fleet of over 8 million drones by 
2050. Among these more than 500,000 drones will be 
used for commercial applications [3]. The 
aforementioned UTM concepts – NASA UTM and 
U-space – provide infrastructure and some concepts 
for operating the airspace free of conflicts. DAA 
plays a central role in each of these concepts. 
In case of mixed traffic, for example near an 
airport, UAS have to be integrated in current airspace 
and have to share it with manned aviation. Present 
flight rules shall be adopted and obeyed. Aircraft 
have to be separated in their airspace to avoid near 
misses or even mid-air incidents. In European 
airspace classes A to F separation is provided by 
ATC [4]. Nevertheless, ATC can command to carry 
out self-separation in which case the UAS would 
need DAA equipment. In class G separation is not 
provided by ATC, pilots are responsible to stay well-
clear on their own. Again, some means of DAA are 
needed.  
Remain Well-Clear 
Manned aviation follows the rules of the air 
which are written down in ICAO Annex 2 [18] and 
recently transferred to SERA Part A (Standardized 
European Rules of the Air) [19]. The notion “well-
clear” is used in ICAO Annex 2 but neither provides 
any minimum separation distances nor explains what 
remain-well-clear exactly is. This leaves room for 
interpretation of a safe distance to other aircraft. 
The ICAO Annex 2 relies on the human eye and 
gut-feeling of the pilot to estimate a safe separation in 
order to stay well-clear throughout the whole 
maneuver. A UAS on the other hand, as autonomous 
or at least partly automated machinery needs proper 
definitions of Remain-Well-Clear in order to operate 
safely. When implementing UAS into civil airspace, 
exact well-clear distances have to be determined. The 
Offset (further discussed on page 4) is an important 
input for the scenarios, which will be treated in a 
latter section of this paper. Generally speaking, the 
more complex the traffic scenario is, the more 
complex the Remain-Well-Clear situation. The Offset 
adds complexity to the traffic scenarios, since it 
changes the encounter geometries. Evasive 
manoeuvers may lead to even more dangerous 
situations. The Offset changes the relative bearing 
and relative speed over time, even if both aircraft (as 
assumed) remain at a constant speed and heading. So 
the Offset has an essential consequence on the 
complexity of Remain-Well-Clear and is therefore 
important to consider. 
Sensor detection range 
In order to make UAS “see” other air traffic, 
sensors have to be installed that are able to detect air 
traffic. Different technologies could provide the UAS 
with distance detections. To choose an appropriate 
sensor technique the required sensor detection range 
has to be determined. This sensor detection range is 
also known as radar declaration range (RDR) [14]. 
But we use the term sensor detection range since 
other sensors than radar are common in the context of 
UAS. In this paper we develop scenarios for 
determining these sensor ranges. Depending on the 
traffic scenario, the required detection range varies. 
Consequently, a number of different traffic scenarios 
is developed that can be used in simulations to 
determine sensor ranges. The results in turn can then 
be used to give recommendations about necessary 
detection ranges. 
Related Work 
The integration of unmanned or remotely piloted 
aircraft has been investigated for several years 
now [5], and various concepts for different use-cases 
and scenarios have been suggested. Simulations have 
shown that in principal an integration of single UAS 
into the existing ATM system is possible [6]. Other 
concepts aim at changing the airspace structure 
specifically for integrating small UAS, for example 
by introducing specialized UAS traffic management 
(UTM). A popular example is NASA UTM [1]. To 
advance the European counterpart U-Space recently a 
blue-print paper has been released [7]. Similarly, the 
Global UTM Association has drafted a holistic 
architecture for a UTM implementation covering 
aspects of U-space [8]. 
Simulations have been devised to demonstrate 
different UTM concepts. Ramasamy et al. have 
shown a separation concept in MATLAB-based 
simulations that includes the avoidance of individual 
buildings [9]. Simulations have been carried out to 
determine the possibility of operating drone networks 
in urban areas [10]. Further, integration concepts 
have been proposed for the non-urban airspace [11]. 
Mũnoz, C. et. al. published a paper with the title 
“A TCAS-II Resolution Advisory Detection 
Algorithm” [12]. That paper has the same objective 
like this paper and shall therefore be briefly 
discussed. Mũnoz’ paper aims for an algorithm to 
predict the detection of a TCAS corrective Resolution 
Advisory. The approach is formally verified to 
characterize all encounter geometries between two 
aircraft (that lead to a resolution advisory within a 
given look-ahead time interval) completely and 
correctly. The author of this paper found the 
analytical approach too complex and thus developed 
a numerical approach. Nevertheless, both papers 
share the same assumptions: 
 Accurate vector state information for two 
aircraft,  
 Aircraft linear trajectories, 
 Constant speed of both aircraft and 
 TCAS sensitivity level remains constant 
The numeric approach uses easy mathematical 
terms and is therefore easy to implement in an 
engineering context. It also provides data for the 
steps in-between and can show exactly when and 
how long a Resolution Advisory is triggered. 
However, a comparison of results was not performed. 
In the following year Mũnoz, C. et. al. have 
continued their work on DAA problems. Their notion 
of Well-Clear, together with a prototype DAA 
implementation has been demonstrated in the 
DAIDALUS system [13]. Consequently, their work 
resulted in an RTCA standard, the DO-365 [14]. This 
document also includes an extended formal definition 
of Well-Clear that can be adapted to TCAS and 
similar systems. 
Traffic Scenarios 
The sensor detection range is defined as the 
largest distance between two aircraft at which a safe 
detection can be achieved. This detection range 
depends on multiple parameters. For example, the 
detection range between two aircraft may not be 
symmetric: In case one aircraft is rather large while 
the other is small (drones may even be tiny) the 
detection range from the large to the small aircraft 
might be considerable larger than vice versa, given 
that both use the same sensor. Further, the 
surroundings of an aircraft can degrade its 
detectability by sensors. For instance, a low-flying 
UAS in an urban area can become almost invisible 
from above due to optical effects, multi-path 
phenomena, etc., while the UAS itself can clearly 
detect traffic above against the blue sky. Clearly, 
many more of such parameters exist, and most of 
them are depending on the actual use-case scenario. 
Speed and Geometry 
In this paper we only address parameters that are 
independent of the actual use-case and of the vehicle 
used. These parameters are the speeds of the aircraft, 
and the overall encounter geometry. It is assumed 
that the manned aircraft has always right of way so 
the UAS has to give way, according to the rules of 
the air. Obeying the rules of the air means that the 
UAS has to make an evasive maneuver to the right if 
they are flying head-on or approximately head-
on [15]. We assume that a right turn is preferred over 
a left turn with both aircraft on a converging course, 
even though the rules of the air do not specify the 
direction of turn. In this paper changes of altitude or 
speed as means of an evasive maneuver are not 
considered. 
Simulations will be performed, calculating the 
required evasive maneuver and the maximum 
required detection range of the sensors. The 
description of simulations and their outcome will not 
be detailed in this paper. This paper focusses on the 
description of the numerical approach to determine 
sensor detection ranges. Triggering a TCAS 
resolution advisory (RA) at the other aircraft must be 
avoided and is an essential requirement for the 
simulations and for the traffic scenarios. Triggering 
TCAS traffic alerts (TA) at the other aircraft while 
executing an evasive maneuver is allowed though. 
Traffic scenarios were created with respect to 
the mentioned constraints. The speeds of the other 
aircraft as well as the speed of the UAS vary between 
0kts and 500kts in equal intervals. Looking from the 
other aircraft’s perspective, the relative bearing 
between both aircraft varies from 70° to 180°, where 
180° is a head-on situation and a relative bearing of 
90° means the UAS approaches from the left. 
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Figure 1. UAS head-on and UAS converging from 
the left (90°) 
TCAS has different sensitivity levels, which 
vary with altitude [16]. Each sensitivity level has a 
different tau value given in units of seconds, refer to 
Figure 2. The aircraft distance divided by the relative 
closing speed is a time value given in seconds. This 
time value is the remaining time until arriving at the 
target point, thus it shall be called 𝑡𝑇𝑃. In TCAS II 
systems 𝑡𝑇𝑃  is the aforementioned tau value and is 
used as an estimate for the time until CPA (closest 
point of approach) although this is only accurate in 
case the CPA is a real collision point, that is where 
Offset = 0. 
Is the calculated 𝑡𝑇𝑃 smaller than the TCAS RA 
tau value, a resolution advisory is triggered. This was 
also considered when traffic scenarios were created. 
Also the DMOD (Distance Modification) value of 
TCAS II was considered, but never influenced the 
offset calculation. Hence it is not shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. TCAS definition of sensitivity levels (SL) 
and tau values [16] 
Offset 
The traffic scenarios created so far all describe 
two aircraft on collision course. In reality this is a 
possible but rare scenario, and should not be the only 
type of scenario to investigate. The most common 
case would be that conflicting aircraft approach each 
other up to a certain CPA where the distance is below 
some required safety separation distance. Often the 
trajectories of aircraft cross each other, with the 
aircraft arriving at the crossing point at different 
times. A further case is a head-on scenario (relative 
bearing 180°), where the two trajectories are parallel 
to each other with a certain distance below safety 
separation. We refer to this distance as the Offset. 
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Figure 3. Head-on scenario with an offset to the 
left 
However, in a head-on scenario with an Offset 
as shown in Figure 3 the evasive maneuver must start 
earlier (compared to a head-on scenario with no 
offset) since only right turns are allowed. This also 
increases the required detection range of the sensors. 
For a head-on scenario it is obvious, that the highest 
required detection range is gained by taking 
maximum speeds of both aircraft. The offset also 
increases the detection range, but only up to the point 
where the offset becomes larger than the safety 
separation. Then, the TCAS resolution advisory of 
the other aircraft is not triggered any more. Traffic 
scenarios where the TCAS RA is not triggered shall 
not be considered in the simulations. 
The maximum applicable offset has to be 
determined which will just trigger a TCAS resolution 
advisory if both aircraft would stay on their 
trajectories. In the simulation this will result in the 
highest required detection range. 
Calculation of Offset 
Microsoft Excel was chosen for development of 
a calculation model. The model calculates the starting 
points of both aircraft by the inputs given to the 
calculation model. These are: 
 Target point, 
 Speed of each aircraft: 𝑠𝑈 and 𝑠𝐴, 
 Relative bearing α and 
 Offset r 
 
Starting points as well as the target point are 
given in geographic coordinates. The other aircraft 
always aims to the given target point. The UAS 
however only aims for the same target point if Offset 
= 0. If the offset has a positive or negative value 
other than “0”, the UAS’ target point is shifted on an 
orthogonal line to the own trajectory. The given 
offset is the distance along the orthogonal line 
between the two target points. The specific time to 
reach the target point can then be calculated from the 
parameters given. 
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Figure 4. Offset movement on an orthogonal line 
Given that the relative bearing is always 
between 90° and 270° this means that the target 
points are effectively identical to the CPA. This 
would not be the case for bearings smaller than 90° 
or larger than 270°. 
Based on the starting points, trajectories and 
speeds, the distance 𝑑(𝑡)  and the relative closing 
speed ?̇?(𝑡) can be calculated as functions over t: 
𝑑(𝑡) = √(
𝑟 cos 𝛼 − 𝑠𝑈𝑡 sin 𝛼
𝑠𝐴𝑡 − 𝑟 sin 𝛼 − 𝑠𝑈𝑡 cos 𝛼
)
2
 
?̇?(𝑡) =
𝑡(𝑠𝑈
2 + 𝑠𝐴
2 − 2𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑈 cos 𝛼) − 2𝑟𝑠𝐴 sin 𝛼)
𝑑(𝑡)
 
The relative closing speed ?̇?(𝑡)  is constant if 
Offset = 0. If the offset deviates from “0”, the relative 
closing speed ?̇?(𝑡) is changing over time. 
𝑡𝑇𝑃 =
𝑑(𝑡)
?̇?(𝑡)
 
𝑡𝑇𝑃  is compared to the TCAS resolution 
advisory tau values. If 𝑡𝑇𝑃 is positive but smaller than 
the TCAS tau value, a TCAS RA will be triggered. In 
traffic scenarios where 𝑡𝑇𝑃 is always greater than the 
TCAS RA tau value the results are not of interest for 
this study, since this traffic scenario would not cause 
an avoidance maneuver. 
Due to the singularity around 𝑡 = 0 the graphs 
of 𝑡𝑇𝑃  have hyperbolic form. Thus, in order to get 
sufficient accuracy in plots and numerical evaluations 
time steps need to become smaller with 𝑡𝑇𝑃 
approaching 0. For example if 𝑡𝑇𝑃 is 120 seconds, the 
time step should be 10 to 15 seconds. If 𝑡𝑇𝑃 is less 
than 20 seconds, the time step is chosen as 1 second. 
The time step gradually decreases with decreasing 
𝑡𝑇𝑃. 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 show exemplary plots for 
two different offsets. The plots have to be interpreted 
from right to left. The right side of the graphs shows 
the starting positions of both aircraft, having the 
biggest distance between them. As the aircraft 
positions converge 𝑡𝑇𝑃 comes closer to the TCAS RA 
tau value. The 𝑡𝑇𝑃 graph goes sharply upwards with 
the closing speed approaching 0 and the quotient 
diverging. The blue graph shows the change of 
𝑡𝑇𝑃 over time, the red graph represents the constant 
TCAS RA tau value. Therefore the latter is 
represented by a horizontal line in the plot. If the 𝑡𝑇𝑃 
plot crosses or touches the TCAS RA plot TCAS is 
triggered, as shown in Figure 5 
 Figure 5. Graphs for TCAS RA tau value and 𝒕𝑻𝑷, 
TCAS triggers 
In order to find the biggest possible offset the 
TCAS RA graph must be the tangent of the 𝑡𝑇𝑃 plot, 
see Figure 6. This is the case if the derivative of 𝑡𝑇𝑃 
becomes 0, that is: 
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
𝑡𝑇𝑃 =
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
𝑑(𝑡)
?̇?(𝑡)
= 0 
This can be transformed to: 
(𝑠𝐴
2 − 2𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑈 cos 𝛼 + 𝑠𝑈
2) (𝑡2(𝑠𝐴
2 − 2𝑠𝐴𝑠𝑈 cos 𝛼 + 𝑠𝑈
2) + 𝑟2 − 2𝑠𝐴𝑟𝑡 sin 𝛼)
(−𝑡(𝑠𝐴2 + 𝑠𝑈2) + 𝑠𝐴𝑟 sin 𝛼 +  2𝑠𝐴𝑡𝑠𝑈 cos 𝛼)2
 
= 2 
This equation has two solutions only one of 
them is positive. It represents the time 𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛  at 
which 𝑡𝑇𝑃  becomes minimal. The offset can be 
calculated by solving 𝑡𝑇𝑃(𝑡𝑇𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛) = 𝜏 with τ being 
the TCAS RA tau value. The easiest way to solve this 
is by numerical methods. For our purposes an 
approximate solution (±1 second) is sufficient, 
because the Offset we want to calculate does not need 
to be too accurate. Thus we implemented a graphical 
solution using the plot graphs shown. 
 
 
Figure 6. TCAS just triggers, Offset is at its 
maximum 
The calculation can be done with Microsoft 
Excel. The process of finding the right value for the 
offset is then a matter of varying the offset until 
tangential behavior is reached. For each scenario two 
offsets are required; one offset to the left and one to 
the right. A macro was written to let Excel iterate the 
required offsets for each scenario. 
Examples of Offsets 
In order to give an impression of the generated 
offsets the table below will show a couple of 
representative scenarios. A Scenario ID was defined 
for a better overview. The first number in the ID 
represents the Sensitivity Level from TCAS, refer to 
Figure 2. The second and third number gives the 
speed in knots of the intruder and the UAS. The forth 
number shows the relative bearing between both 
trajectories. The latter states to which side the 
trajectories are offset; in a head-on scenario L means 
that the UAS is passing the other aircraft on the left 
side. In a 90° scenario L means that the UAS would 
pass the crossing point of both trajectories first. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show an exemplary offset to 
the left (L). 
 
𝑡𝑇𝑃 𝑡𝑇𝑃 
# Scenario ID Offset [NM] 
I 7-500-500-180-L 4,86 
II 5-500-500-180-L 3,46 
III 7-250-250-180-L 2,40 
IV 5-250-250-180-L 1,73 
V 3-250-250-180-L 1,03 
VI 7-500-500-70-L 4,56 
VII 7-500-500-70-R 5,61 
VIII 7-500-500-90-L 4,86 
IX 7-500-500-90-R 4,86 
X 5-500-500-70-L 3,26 
XI 5-500-500-70-R 4,08 
XII 3-250-250-90-R 2,42 
XIII 3-100-100-90-R 0,96 
XIV  3-100-100-70-R  0,97 
Table 1. Examples of Offsets 
Discussion 
Looking at the scenarios and their offsets in the 
previous section a few peculiarities shall be 
discussed. 
Scenarios I and II share the same encounter 
geometry and the same speeds but have different 
TCAS Sensitivity Levels. Thus the TCAS tau value is 
different. The different offsets therefore result from 
TCAS’ characteristics. Figure 7 shows Scenario I.  
 
Figure 7. Scenario I 
The intruder’s path is shown in purple and the 
ownship’s path is shown in green. Yellow represents 
a TCAS TA, red depicts TCAS RA. The cross shows 
the target point of the ownship. Both axes show 
figures in meter. The origin of the plots is always the 
start point of the ownship. 
Keeping the same encounter geometries with 
halved speeds like in scenarios I and III or II and IV 
results in a reduction of offsets by about one half. For 
head-on scenarios like I, II, III and IV the offset is 
therefore linearly related to the change of relative 
speed. However, this linearity does not hold for 
encounter geometries other than head-on (180°). 
Keeping the speed steady but changing the 
encounter geometry from 180° to 90° like in 
scenarios I and VIII, or I and IX, the offset is roughly 
the same. The plots of the Scenario I (Figure 7), VIII 
(Figure 8) and IX (Figure 9) show a small red line 
which indicates that the TCAS RA is just triggered. 
 
Figure 8. Scenario VIII 
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
-20000 -10000  0  10000  20000
Intruder
Ownship
Target
 0
 10000
 20000
 30000
 40000
 50000
-20000 -10000  0  10000  20000
Intruder
Ownship
Target
 Figure 9. Scenario IX 
Scenarios VII stands out as it features the 
highest offset. This is because the trajectories cross 
each other before the target point, and the initial 
relative distance is smaller than in any other scenario 
with speeds of 500 kts for both aircraft. Thus TCAS 
is triggered very early. 
Comparing Scenario VII and IX the offsets 
become bigger as the relative bearing gets smaller. 
This is just true to a certain degree, since a very small 
relative bearing would result in a very small relative 
speed and therefore decreases the offset again. So 
there must be a certain relative bearing where a 
maximum is reached for the offset. However, this 
calculation is not part of this paper. 
Scenarios V, XIII and XIV feature low altitudes 
(1000 to 2350 ft AGL [16]) at low speeds. Regarding 
an offset to the right and comparing scenarios I, VII 
and IX, encounter geometries of 70° results in the 
biggest offsets. This is also true for scenarios XIII 
and XIV. The range of FLARM is typically 3 - 5 km 
[17], depending upon antenna and installation. That is 
a range of 1,62 to 2,70 NM. Still scenarios XIV and 
XV are well in this range. 
 
Figure 10. Scenario XIV 
Outlook 
The produced scenarios with their offsets will be 
used to simulate evasive maneuvers of the UAS in 
order to not trigger TCAS. The focus of the 
simulation is on the moment of initiation of the 
evasive maneuver. The 𝑡𝑇𝑃  from that point in time 
can be derived as a distance. This distance will be the 
basis for future calculations of the required minimum 
sensor detection range. Further work will be done to 
investigate additional scenarios and conduct 
simulations studies. The simulations and analyses of 
the results of the simulations are still pending and 
will be conducted in a follow-up paper. 
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